Unemployment, Income Growth and Social Security by Watanabe, Minoru et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Unemployment, Income Growth and
Social Security
Minoru Watanabe and Yusuke Miyake and Masaya Yasuoka
Hokusei Gakuen University, Shigakukan University, Kwansei Gakuin
University
12 April 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/86155/
MPRA Paper No. 86155, posted 13 April 2018 03:28 UTC
1 
 
 
 
Unemployment, Income Growth and Social Security† 
 
 
Minoru Watanabe‡, Yusuke Miyake§, Masaya Yasuoka¶ 
 
Abstract 
Considering the sustainability of social security in an aging society with fewer 
children, income growth and population growth are important factors. With a decrease 
in income growth or population growth, social security transfers such as pension benefits 
cannot be provided. The intergenerational social security benefit is being reassessed in 
some OECD countries. In Japan, social security benefits for younger people are small 
because of an aging society. 
This paper presents description of an unemployment model with a minimum wage 
and social security benefits and presents examination of how unemployment benefits for 
the younger people affect income growth, fertility, and welfare. The results described 
herein demonstrate that unemployment benefits raise the capital stock and income level 
per capita. Therefore, this benefit should be provided to maintain the tax revenue for 
social security. Moreover, this benefit can increase social welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
The average unemployment rate in Japan is 2.8% at 2017. In OECD countries, the 
unemployment rate is decreasing. The factors causing unemployment are demand 
deficiency and frictional unemployment. Furthermore, because of resistance to 
downward wage pressure from labor unions, price mechanisms do not function to achieve 
full employment. This creates conditions of structural unemployment. 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
%
Year
Unemployment Rate 
France Germany Italy
Japan Sweden United Kingdom
United States OECD ‐ Total
 
Fig. 1: Unemployment rate in OECD countries (data: OECD Statistics). 
 
Unemployment presents important difficulties in an aging society with fewer 
children. The government cannot collect sufficient tax revenues to maintain social 
security programs if many younger people remain unemployed. Therefore, it is important 
to examine how unemployment occurs and how a government should address the 
difficulties posed by unemployment. 
Many reports of the related literature describe studies of unemployment. Acemoglu 
(1999), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2003) and Sinko (2007), 
Lehmann, Parmentier and van Der Linden (2011), Gomis-Porqueras, Julien and Wang 
(2013) establish search models and examine how the unemployment rate is determined. 
Fanti and Gori (2007, 2011) and Lee and Saez (2012) use minimum wage models to 
examine how unemployment is determined. In addition, these analyses derive the 
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optimality of the minimum wage and the respective effects on fertility and income growth. 
Fanti and Gori (2007) shows that the subsidy for child care increases the unemployment 
level in the endogenous fertility model. Fanti and Gori (2011) derives that the minimum 
wage with unemployment benefit raises the income growth even if the unemployment 
occurs. Tamai (2009) sets the political economy model to examine the income inequality, 
income growth and unemployment.  
Corneo and Marquardt (2000), Imoto (2003), Bräuninger (2005), and Aronsson, 
Sjögren and Dalin (2009) consider labor union models or wage bargaining models and 
elucidate how unemployment occurs. 
Ono (2007, 2010), after considering a model with unemployment benefit and pension 
benefit, examines how these policies affect income growth and the unemployment rate. 
Wang (2015) assesses endogenous fertility and unemployment and how they are affected 
by a social security system. Reportedly, for any given minimum wage, a pension might 
improve fertility and decrease unemployment.  
We expand the model reported by Wang (2015) and construct a two-term overlapping 
generation model with a given minimum wage. We analyze a model that includes 
existing unemployment by the minimum wage and social security. The model includes 
the assumption of unemployment benefits and a pension for an assessment plan. 
Furthermore, we analyze how the unemployment benefit as redistribution policy for the 
young generation affects growth, the birthrate, and welfare. As a main conclusion, the 
existence of unemployment benefits brings an increase in capital stock and income per 
capita. In addition to this result, our manuscript can show that the unemployment 
benefit can improve the birthrate and welfare. 
The organization of the remainder of this paper is the following. The next section 
constructs a perfectly competitive market model with an overlapping-generations model 
of a la Diamond (1965). Section 3 shows the equilibrium. Section 4 examines the effect 
of the minimum wage on the unemployment government divide income tax to education 
and public pension with an exogenous income tax. Section 4 illustrates the dynamics of 
our model. The final section concludes the paper. 
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2. The Model 
There exist three types of agents: households, firms, and the government. 
2.1 Firms 
We assume the production function of 
௜ܻ,௧ ൌ ܭ௜,௧ఏ ൫ܣ௜,௧ܮ௜,௧൯ଵିఏ, 0 ൏ ߠ ൏ 1, ݅ ൌ 1,⋯ ܫி (1). 
In that equation, ܭ௜,௧ and ܮ௜,௧ respectively denote the capital stock and labor input of 
the firm ݅ in t period. ܣ௜,௧ represents the productivity or knowledge of production of 
firm ݅ . ௜ܻ,௧  denotes the output of firm ݅ . There exist the number of ܫி  firms. It is 
assumed as ܣ௜,௧ ≡ ܭ௧ ௧ܰ⁄ . This assumption is the same as that presented by Romer (1990), 
Fanti and Gori (2011), Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), and others. 
We assume unemployment in this model economy. The labor input is given as 
ܮ௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݑ௧ሻ ௧ܰ, (2) 
where ௧ܰ and ݑ௧ respectively denote the population size of younger people in t period 
and the unemployment rate (or the length of the unemployment). In this model economy, 
the government sets the minimum wage system as Wang (2015). If ݓ௖,௧ is given by the 
wage rate of the competitive market without the minimum wage system that is, ݑ௧ ൌ 0, 
then the minimum wage ݓ௠,௧ is given as 
ݓ௠,௧ ൌ ߤݓ௖,௧, 1 ൏ ߤ, (3) 
where ߤ denotes the level of minimum wage. Then, if we assume homogeneous firms, 
the wage rate ݓ௠,௧ and the interest rate are given as  
ݓ௠,௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݇௧ሺ1 െ ݑ௧ሻିఏ, (4) 
ߜ ൅ ݎ௧ ൌ ߠሺ1 െ ݑ௧ሻଵିఏ, 0 ൏ ߜ ൏ 1. (5) 
We notify the aggregate production function ௧ܻ ൌ ܭ௧ఏሺܣ௧ܮ௧ሻଵିఏ , ܭ௜,௧ ൌ ܭ௝,௧ ൌ ܭ௧ , ܮ௜,௧ ൌ
ܮ௝,௧ ൌ ܮ௧ and ܣ௧ ൌ ܭ௧ ௧ܰ⁄ . Here, ߜ denotes the capital stock depreciation rate. 
Then, with the model of the minimum wage, the employment rate 1 െ ݑ௧  is 
negatively correlated with the level of ߤ. 
1 െ ݑ௧ ൌ ߤ
ିଵ
ఏ . (6) 
Considering (5) and (6), the interest rate is given by the fixed value as 
ݎ௧ ൌ ݎ ൌ ߠߤ
ఏିଵ
ఏ െ ߜ. (7) 
We assume ߠߤഇషభഇ ൐ ߜ to be a positive value. 
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2.2. Household 
Based on Wang (2015), we set the household behavior. The individuals of households 
exist in two periods: young and old period and obtain the utility from consumption and 
the number of children. In the young period, the younger people work or confront 
unemployment and obtain the wage or unemployment benefit. In the old period, the older 
people obtain the capital income and pension to consume goods and the services. Then, 
the utility function ݒ௧ is assumed as 
ݒ௧ ൌ ߙ log ܿ௬,௧ ൅ ߚ log ܿ௢,௧ାଵ ൅ ߛ log ݊௧, (8) 
where ܿ௬,௧ and ܿ௢,௧ାଵ respectively denote consumption in the young and old periods. The 
number of the children given by ݊௧ . ߙ, ߚ	and	ߛ  denote the parameters in [0, 1]. We 
assume ߙ ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛ ൌ 1. 
The budget constraints of young and old periods are given respectively by the 
following equation. 
ܿ௬,௧ ൅ ߝ݊௧ ൅ ݏ௧ ൌ ܫ௧ ≡ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ݑ௧ሻݓ௠,௧ ൅ ܾ௧ݑ௧, (9) 
ܿ௢,௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻݏ௧ ൅ ߣ௧ାଵ. (10) 
Therein, ܾ௧  and ߣ௧ାଵ  respectively denote the unemployment benefit and pension 
benefit. These benefits are financed by income taxation, the tax rate of which is ߬. Here, 
ݏ௧ denotes saving; ߝ is the child-care cost ሺ0 ൏ ߝሻ. 
The households optimally allocate funds to maximize the utility function (8) subject 
to the budget constraint (9) and (10) as 
ݏ௧ ൌ ߚ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܫ௧ െ ሺߙ ൅ ߛሻߣ௧ାଵ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻ , (11) 
݊௧ ൌ ߛ
ሾሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܫ௧ ൅ ߣ௧ାଵሿ
ߝሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻ , (12) 
ܿ௬,௧ ൌ ߙߛ ߝ݊௧. (13) 
 
2.3. Government 
The government collects the income tax revenue to provide the unemployment benefit 
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and pension. As reported by Wang (2015), although the two types of benefits exist, the 
only mode of financing is income taxation. The government budget constraint is given as 
߬ሺ1 െ ݑ௧ሻݓ௠,௧ ௧ܰ ൌ ܾ௧ݑ௧ ௧ܰ ൅ ߣ௧ ௧ܰିଵ. (14) 
The parts of ߬ሺ1 െ ݑ௧ሻݓ௠,௧ ௧ܰ , ܾ௧ݑ௧ ௧ܰ  and ߣ௧ ௧ܰିଵ respectively denote the tax revenue, 
the unemployment benefit, and the pension benefit. Based on a study by Fanti and Gori 
(2011), unemployment benefit ܾ௧ is assumed as 
ܾ௧ ൌ ߮ݓ௖,௧, 0 ൏ ߮ ൏ 1. (15) 
Different from Wang (2015), this model setting assumes an exogenous income tax rate 
to provide social security benefits of some types. Omori (2009) sets the exogenous income 
tax rate to provide public education investment and a pension benefit. 
 
3. Equilibrium 
The dynamics is given by the capital stock accumulation. Considering  ௧ܰାଵ ൌ ݊௧ ௧ܰ, the 
dynamics of capital per capita is given as 
݇௧ାଵ ൌ ݏ௧݊௧ . (16) 
Considering (3) and (14), the pension benefit is 
ߣ௧ ൌ ൤߬ߤ
ିଵ
ఏ െ ߮ߤ ൬1 െ ߤ
ିଵ
ఏ ൰൨ݓ௠,௧݊௧ିଵ. (17) 
The following condition is necessary to obtain a positive value of pension benefit. 
ߤିଵఏ ൐ ߮ߤ ൬1 െ ߤ
ିଵ
ఏ ൰. (18) 
This condition shows that the tax revenue per capita is larger than the unemployment 
benefit per capita. This condition is usual. Then, the dynamics of capital stock per capita 
is 
݇௧ାଵ ൌ ݇∗ ൌ ߚߝߛሺ1 ൅ ܼሻ. (19) 
In that equation, 
ܼ ≡ ൤߬ߤఏିଵఏ െ ߮ ൬1 െ ߤିଵఏ ൰൨ 1 െ ߠ1 ൅ ݎ. (20) 
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With (18), we obtain ܼ ൐ 0. 
 
4. Effects of unemployment 
This section presents an examination of how the unemployment benefit affects the 
capital stock per capita and others. Considering (19) and ௗ௓ௗఝ ൏ 0, we obtain the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 
Unemployment benefits raise the capital stock per capita and the output per capita in 
the long run. 
 
Unemployment benefits reduce the pension benefit because of the constant income 
tax rate. A decrease in pension benefits promotes capital accumulation. Then, the capital 
stock per capita rises. Considering (5), the unemployment benefit does not change the 
employment rate. Therefore, we obtain Prop 1. The fertility in t period is derived as 
݊௧ ൌ
ߛ ൤ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߤఏିଵఏ ൅ ߮ ൬1 െ ߤିଵఏ ൰൨ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݇௧
ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
௜௡௖௢௠௘	௜௡	௬௢௨௡௚ ௣௘௥௜௢ௗ
ߝ െ ߛܼ݇௧ାଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
௣௘௡௦௜௢௡	௕௘௡௘௙௜௧
ൌ ݊ሺܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁ ݅݊ ݕ݋ݑ݊݃ ݌݁ݎ݅݋݀, ݌݁݊ݏ݅݋݊ ܾ݂݁݊݁݅ݐሻ. 
(21)
    The fertility in the period increases with income in the young period (wage income 
+ unemployment benefit) and pension benefit. The unemployment benefit raises the 
income in the young period and reduces the pension benefit. Given ݇௧ ൐ 0, the effect of 
unemployment benefit on the fertility is derived as  
݀݊௧
݀߮ ൌ
ߛሺ1 െ ߠሻ ൬1 െ ߤିଵఏ ൰ ݇௧
ߝሾ1 ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻܼሿଶᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
வ଴
ܩ. (22) 
where 
ܩ ≡ ൤ሺ1 ൅ ܼሻ െ ܪ1 ൅ ݎ൨ ሾ1 ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻܼሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻሺ1 ൅ ܼሻ
ܪ
1 ൅ ݎ,  
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ܪ ≡ ൤ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߤఏିଵఏ ൅ ߮ ൬1 െ ߤିଵఏ ൰൨ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ ൐ 0,  
Because of (18), we obtain 1 ൅ ܼ ൐ ுଵା௥. Furthermore, we obtain ܩ ൐ 0 and 
ௗ௡೟
ௗఝ ൐ 0. 
Considering (19) and (20), the fertility in the long run is given as 
݊∗ ൌ
ߚ ൤ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߤఏିଵఏ ൅ ߮ ൬1 െ ߤିଵఏ ൰൨ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ
1 ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻܼ . 
(23) 
The numerator of (23) increases with the unemployment benefit. The denominator of 
(23) decreases with the unemployment benefit because of ௗ௓ௗఝ ൏ 0 . Therefore, ݊∗ 
increases with the unemployment benefit. The dynamics reaches the steady state in ݐ ൅
1 period if we consider t period as the initial period. Then, the following proposition can 
be established. 
 
Proposition 2 
The unemployment benefit raises fertility in both the short and long run. 
 
The unemployment benefit reduces the pension benefit in the short and long run. 
However, the decrease in the pension benefit is smaller than an increase in the income 
in the young period. Therefore, fertility increases. 
As the final study, we derive the effect of unemployment benefit on social welfare. 
We derived the social welfare at the steady state as 
ݒ∗ ൌ ߙ log ܿ௬∗ ൅ ߚ log ܿ௢∗ ൅ ߛ log ݊∗ , (24) 
where ܿ௬∗  and ܿ௢∗ are the consumption in younger period and older period at the steady 
state, respectively. 
From Prop. 2 and (13), we obtain ௗ௡
∗
ௗఝ ൐ 0 and 
ௗ௖೤∗
ௗఝ ൐ 0. Moreover, the consumption 
in older period ܿ௢,௧ାଵ increases the unemployment benefit in the short and long run. 
However, the consumption in the young period at the initial t period decreases with the 
unemployment benefit.1 For that reason, the following proposition can be established. 
 
                             
1 See Appendix for a detailed proof. 
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Proposition 3 
The unemployment benefit raises social welfare at the steady state. 
 
Consumption in the young period and fertility at the steady state increase with the 
unemployment benefit. Because of the unemployment benefit, the pension benefit 
decreases and private saving rises. The latter effect is dominant. Therefore, consumption 
in the old period rises.2 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our paper sets a two-period overlapping generations model and examines the effect of 
social security benefits. The results obtained from our study are shown as follows. The 
unemployment benefit increases the capital per capita and output per capita. The 
fertility for any period rises. The welfare at the steady state can be pulled up by the 
unemployment benefit. 
Wang (2015) mainly examines the effect of pension benefit as the redistribution 
policy of older people. However, our manuscript presents examination of the effect of 
unemployment benefit as the redistribution policy for younger people. In addition, our 
manuscript derives the effect on welfare, which was not examined by Wang (2015). 
Our manuscript sets labor income taxation for social security. This setting is 
consistent with those of some OECD countries including Japan, which sets the pay-as-
you-go pension. Not to say, we can consider the other types of taxation such as capital 
income taxation and others.  
The result of our manuscript shows that the unemployment benefit does not affect 
the unemployment rate because of the model setting. As Fanti and Gori (2011) have 
reported, if a Cobb–Douglas production function considered, then the unemployment 
rate depends only on the level of the minimum wage. 
 
 
                             
2 Prop 3 considers only the case of the steady state. In the Appendix, we examine the 
social welfare function in both the steady state and a transitional path. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 
This appendix presents examination of how the effect of the unemployment benefit 
affects consumption in the old period. The budget constraint of the household gives the 
following consumption in the old period: 
ܿ௢,௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻݏ௧ ൅ ߣ௧ାଵ ൌ ݃݊௧݇௧ାଵ ൌ ݃ݏ௧. (25) 
In that equation, 
݃ ≡ ൜ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ ൅ ൤߬ߤఏିଵఏ െ ߮ ൬1 െ ߤିଵఏ ൰൨ ሺ1 െ ߠሻൠ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 ൅ ܼሻ. (26) 
We obtain ௗ௖೚೟శభௗఝ ൌ ቀ݇௧ାଵ
ௗ௚
ௗఝ ൅ ݃
ௗ௞೟శభ
ௗఝ ቁ ݊௧ ൅ ݃݇௧ାଵ
ௗ௡೟
ௗఝ  because of (25). Then, we obtain  
൬݇௧ାଵ ݀݃݀߮ ൅ ݃
݀݇௧ାଵ
݀߮ ൰ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ ൬1 െ ߤ
ିଵ
ఏ ൰ ݇௧ାଵ ൤ ݃ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 ൅ ܼሻ െ 1൨.  
Because of (26), we obtain ݃ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ1 ൅ ܼሻ  and ቀ݇௧ାଵ ௗ௚ௗఝ ൅ ݃
ௗ௞೟శభ
ௗఝ ቁ ൌ 0 . Finally, 
ௗ௖೚೟శభ
ௗఝ ൌ ݃݇௧ାଵ
ௗ௡೟
ௗఝ  is obtainable. Because of ݇௧ାଵ ൌ ݇∗ ൐ 0 and ݀݊௧ ݀߮⁄ ൐ 0 from Prop. 2. 
Then, we obtain ௗ௖೚೟శభௗఝ ൐ 0 in the short run and 
ௗ௖೚∗
ௗఝ ൐ 0 in the long run. 
The consumption of older people in the initial t period is ܿ௢,௧ ൌ ݃݊௧ିଵ݇௧ , which 
depends on  ݇௧, ݊௧ିଵ  and not ߮. Then, ௗ௖೚೟ௗఝ ൌ
ௗ௚
ௗఝ ݊௧ିଵ݇௧ ൏ 0 is obtainable. This result 
illustrates that the unemployment benefit reduces both the pension benefit and the 
consumption of older people in t period. 
(Q.E.D.) 
 
Appendix 2 
This Appendix derives the social welfare function and examines the effect of 
unemployment benefit. Based on van Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003), we define 
the social welfare function that the initial period is given by t period. 
௧ܸ ≡ ෍ߩ௝ି௧൛ߙ log ܿ௬,௝ିଵ ൅ ߚ log ܿ௢,௝ ൅ ߛ log ௝݊ିଵൟ
ஶ
௝ୀ௧
 
ൌ ߩ1 െ ߩ logܦ ൅ ܨሺ݊௧ିଵ, ݇௧ሻ. 
where 
11 
 
ܦ ≡ ሺ1 ൅ ܼሻ
ሺଵିఘሻሺఘାఉሻ
ఘ
൤ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߤఏିଵఏ ൅ ߮ ൬1 െ ߤିଵఏ ൰൨ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ
1 ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻܼ  
ܨሺ݊௧ିଵ, ݇௧ሻ ≡ log ݊௧ିଵ ൅ ሺߩ ൅ ߚሻ log ݇௧ ൅ ߩ1 െ ߩ logሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ ൅
ߙ
1 െ ߩ log ߙ 
൅ߙ ൅ ߩߚ1 െ ߩ log ߝ ൅
ߩሺ1 െ ߩ െ ߚሻ െ ߙ
1 െ ߩ log ߛ ൅
ߩሺߩ ൅ ߚሻ
1 െ ߩ logߚ. 
ܼ ≡ ൤߬ߤఏିଵఏ െ ߮ ൬1 െ ߤିଵఏ ൰൨ 1 െ ߠ1 ൅ ݎ. 
ρ denotes the discount factor in (0, 1). ݊௧ିଵ and ݇௧ is given at t period. Because 
ܨሺ݊௧ିଵ, ݇௧ሻ is independent of ߮, then, with ௗ஽ௗఝ ൐ 0, we obtain 
ௗ௏೟
ௗఝ ൐ 0. 
ሺଵିఘሻሺఘାఉሻ
ఘ ൏ ∆ 
is the sufficient condition to hold ௗ௏೟ௗఝ ൐ 0. ∆ is given as 
∆≡ ሺ1 ൅ ܼሻ൞ 1 െ ߚ1 ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻܼ ൅
1 ൅ ݎ
൤ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߤఏିଵఏ ൅ ߮ ൬1 െ ߤିଵఏ ൰൨ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ
ൢ. 
The term of ሺଵିఘሻሺఘାఉሻఘ  shows the effect that the unemployment benefit decreases 
the consumption of older people and worsens social welfare in the initial t period. 
However, the term ∆ shows the effect by which the unemployment benefit improves 
the household welfare of individuals born at t or in a later period. Therefore, if the 
latter effect is dominant, the social welfare rises. 
Our paper ignores population size ௧ܰ in deriving this result. However, we can 
derive population size ௧ܰ  to hold this result. In such a case, the population size 
increases. The social welfare can be raised because the unemployment benefit raises 
fertility in the short and long run. 
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